The arrival of the Pobeda and the Chukotka in the USSR occurred against a backdrop of postwar population movement on a vast scale as prisoners of war, evacuees, forced laborers, conscript soldiers, and many others sought ways and means to go home. 3 Yet the Armenian repatriations were distinct from this context of movement in important ways. These
Comments from Peter Gatrell helped shape an early draft of this article. Seth Bernstein, Mark Edele, and Krista Goff also provided helpful information and references in the later stages. I am grateful for the comments of two anonymous reviewers for Kritika. Armenians had not been displaced during World War II; they were the families of Armenians who had been displaced from the Ottoman Empire during World War I and the Armenian genocide. Few had previously set foot in Soviet Armenia. Nonetheless, this process was presented by the Soviet authorities, and accepted by much of the diaspora, as homecoming on an unprecedented scale.
these circumstances, many chose to leave as soon as the Soviet authorities permitted, following the death of Stalin. 9 In the short term, however, they had little choice but to negotiate the Soviet system. For some, it was possible to find a sense of belonging. According to Susan Pattie, "within a generation those who have stayed say they are firmly rooted and speak of their dedication to Armenia. They talk of continuing the contribution of their parents to the society." 10 Among the contemporary Armenian diaspora the repatriations are widely viewed as a failure, and often as the intentional victimization of the Armenian population by the Soviet regime. In 2008, in the interest of improving relations, the newly established Armenian Ministry of the Diaspora issued an apology for the shortcomings of the repatriation campaigns.
11 That repatriation did not live up to expectations is beyond doubt. In this article, however, I aim to shift the focus from the narrative of Soviet betrayal and Armenian victimhood to provide a more nuanced account of repatriation at the level of both state practice and social experience.
I draw upon the records of the Soviet Armenian committee charged with the organization of repatriation along with a series of memoirs written by repatriates. 12 Most of these memoirs were written by repatriates who eventually left Soviet Armenia and reflect their authors' critical stance toward the Soviet Union in general and repatriation in particular. 13 The traces of a greater diversity of repatriate experiences are evident in the archive of the Soviet Armenian committee charged with the organization of repatriation. Read together, although they cannot encompass the full range of repatriate experiences, these sources powerfully illustrate the disjuncture between the ideal and reality of repatriation.
Taking the word "belongings" and its multiple meanings as a starting point, the first part of this article reframes the Armenian repatriations within the broader historical contexts of postwar population movement.
14 It examines how and why the postwar Soviet Union could successfully articulate the claim that diaspora Armenians belonged within its borders, considering how the nature of nationalities policy in Armenia and the economic imperatives of the postwar period came together to shape the campaign.
The second part addresses belongings of a different nature-the material possessions that the repatriates took with them. As David Parkin has explained, the study of refugee belongings offers vital insights into the experience and aftermaths of displacement, not least because "it is through the skills and objects that one may take that one's future may be given shape, at least from the perspective of the departee."
15 Although they were not forced to flee, the same may be said of the repatriates' belongings. Focusing on these items illuminates a further dimension of belonging, the integration of repatriates into Soviet Armenian society, offering insights into not only the hardships the repatriates endured but also the strategies they were able to deploy to negotiate an unfamiliar world.
projects to document the experience of repatriation include Hazel Antramian Hofman (http:// hazelantaramhof-com.webs.com/about). 13 
The Postwar World
Despite the emergence of forms of international cooperation, the management of displacement in postwar Europe proved to be a protracted problem. 16 The settlement of scores and the redrawing of national borders generated new, and often violent, forms of displacement and between 9 and 12 million ethnic Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. 17 Organized population transfers that blurred the boundaries between voluntary and coerced migration displaced many more, including around 1.3 million in the borderlands of Poland and Ukraine. 18 Mark Mazower has suggested that the main reason for these wartime and postwar population transfers was "the inter-war era's unsatisfactory experience with minorities in the new nation states; people were being moved in order to consolidate political boundaries." 19 Although the campaign to repatriate diaspora Armenians to Soviet Armenia was based on the principle of voluntary movement, it was entirely in keeping with this broader desire to consolidate boundaries and create ethnically homogenous states. Achieving these aims through the transfer, exchange, and expulsion of populations was, even before the outbreak of war, a well-established part of modern state practice in Europe.
Yet postwar displacement was not simply a European phenomenon, it was an integral part of the making of new nation-states on a global scale. 21 As Pamela Ballinger has demonstrated, European and colonial displacements, which have been retrospectively bracketed off from one another, "not only run on parallel tracks but cross and entangle at many points." 22 This was true of the Armenian repatriation campaign. Civil war in Greece, the stirrings of decolonization in Syria and Lebanon, and the crisis in northern Iran all helped shape Armenian decisions to resettle in the Soviet Union.
23
Resolving postwar displacement posed particular problems for the Soviet Union. When fighting ceased, millions of displaced Soviet citizens remained in Europe. 24 According to the Yalta agreements, they would all be returned to Soviet territory, regardless of individual preference. Their repatriation, both coerced and voluntary, initially proceeded quickly. 25 However, as resistance to this process increased, European and American authorities ceased complying with forced repatriation.
26 By late 1945, mass repatriation to the Soviet Union was essentially over.
This history of coerced repatriation and displaced persons' (DP) resistance to return played a powerful role in shaping the Cold War image of a refugee as a person fleeing communism. 27 At first sight, the voluntary repatriation of Armenians to the Soviet Union seems to stand in sharp contrast to this 21 image. The Armenian repatriation campaign commenced as mass repatriation of Soviet DPs was coming to an end. Unlike repatriated DPs, the Armenians had never before set foot in the territories to which they were supposed to "return." 28 The Armenian campaign was also organized and administered at the republic level by a Committee for the Repatriation and Resettlement of Armenians from Abroad (Repatriation Committee), quite separately from the central Repatriation Administration responsible for DPs. 29 Nonetheless, there were some striking similarities between these processes. Potential repatriates in the Armenian diaspora and the inhabitants of DP camps alike became the targets of large-scale Soviet recruitment drives. Both were showered with pamphlets and shown films replete with idealized images of a bountiful homeland and emotive images of family and national reunions. 30 Furthermore, recent research has shown that DP returns to the Soviet Union were not universally a matter of coercion and that the treatment of returnees was characterized not by wholesale persecution but by inconsistency and sometimes ambivalence. Both DP repatriations and the Armenian case may be understood as part of the broader project of reconstructing the Soviet Union in the aftermath of war. Across the Soviet Union, as Donald Filtzer has explained, recovery "was constrained not just by shortages of materials, plant and equipment, but also by a shortage of labour power." 32 The Armenian repatriations were not the only attempt to address this by targeting diaspora communities. According to Bruce Adams, "At the end of WWII, the Soviet government was deeply concerned about its disastrous loss of population during the war. It appealed to emigres around the world to come home and help rebuild the motherland."
33 Such "reclamations' were not solely a Soviet phenomenon. Tara Zahra has suggested that the repatriation and renationalization of children in Germany and Austria was also linked to the "acquisition of the productive and reproductive labor necessary for reconstruction." 34 Armenia had been spared wartime occupation. It did not, however, escape the war's social, economic, and demographic consequences. Between 1941 and 1945, the population of the republic declined by 170,000.
35 Armenia's economy was not damaged by the war to the same extent as other regions of the Soviet Union, but the country still emerged from the conflict "poor and hungry."
36 Although Soviet propaganda ostensibly celebrated repatriation as an opportunity to unite the whole Armenian nation, a closer reading reveals an emphasis on attracting those who were able to contribute to the reconstruction of society and economy.
It was always assumed that on arrival repatriates would work and support themselves, even if diaspora organizations helped raise funds to pay for the passage of "needy" repatriates to Armenia. Repatriation was framed as an altruistic or even humanitarian gesture toward long-suffering Armenians, but Soviet generosity had its limits, and "self-sufficiency" was expected. Potential repatriates in the United States who asked about those who could not work were advised by local committees, "Armenia is a country of workers. Those who do not work, do not eat." Those unable to work, it was advised, should ensure that family members could afford to care for them. 37 One poem, "Dig!," published in Sovetakan Hayastan celebrated the physical labor of repatriates building themselves new houses. 38 The use of repatriation as a Soviet strategy for acquiring labor was not lost on international observers. One American report claimed that visas had been granted to Armenian repatriates, "on a selective basis and thus by far most of the immigrants have been young people of child-bearing age, largely from the skilled worker or professional groups which are able to contribute most to the Armenian economy." 39 The notion of repatriates as resources went beyond finding labor. Communications among the Erevan committee, local organizing committees, and potential repatriates suggest that the material and financial resources of repatriates were also understood as potential tools for reconstruction and development. Repatriates were repeatedly advised to bring with them the equipment and machinery necessary for their working lives in Soviet Armenia as well as their personal effects. In part, this emphasis was a product of the kinds of questions the repatriates themselves asked about the fate of their belongings and the possibilities for future livelihoods. However, the waiving of customs duties coupled with repeated advice to repatriates to bring "whatever property they could manage" was suggestive of the way repatriation was understood as a means of gathering resources rather than aiding the needy. grain… . According to the Ukrainian leadership, the intention was not only to supply a workforce to particularly devastated areas, but also to implement a real economic transfer that would replenish the livestock of the Kolkhozy, which had been almost completely destroyed." 41 Though the repatriation campaign was publicly framed in national terms, it was not simply the development of Armenia that was at stake. Repatriation became connected to visions of regional development, overlapping with the mass displacement of tens of thousands of Azerbaijanis from the Armenian Republic to the Azerbaijani Republic between 1948 and 1953.
42 Although these resettlements have been interpreted in some recent Azerbaijani historiography as an ethnic deportation orchestrated by Armenians, the resettlement may be better understood as a product of a complex interplay between nationalities policy and plans for the irrigation and development of the Kura-Araxes region. 43 The parallel evolution of these schemes highlights the extent to which the mobilization of national groups and mass resettlement for the purposes of economic development were entangled and had become accepted practice in the postwar Soviet Union.
Resettlement, Belonging, and the Development of Soviet Armenia
Framing the repatriations as part of a particular moment of post-World War II reconstruction should not obscure how longer-term factors, in particular the aftermath of the Armenian genocide, also shaped the repatriations. On its creation in December 1920, the Soviet Republic of Armenia was immediately faced with a refugee problem on a massive scale. 44 Over the course of the war, around 300,000 refugees had arrived in the region. 45 Caring for them placed a huge burden on a region struggling to recover from the ravages of war. Even so, Soviet Armenia soon became a sanctuary for displaced Armenians. By 41 Gousseff, "Evacuation versus Repatriation," 97. 42 Although initial plans were for the resettlement of around 100,000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia, far fewer actually resettled, perhaps around 50,000. 43 This narrative emerged in the post-Soviet context of the Nagorno-Karabagh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani resettlements have thus far been understudied, but see the new research by Krista Goff, "Postwar Deportation: The Resettlement of Azerbaijanis in the South Caucasus," unpublished paper presented at "Stalinism and War," Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 25 May 2016. 44 The background to the Soviet republic's creation is described in Richard Hovannisian, "The Republic of Armenia," in The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, ed. Hovannisian (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 340-44. 45 For details of arrivals, see Sargsyan, "Arevmtahayeri Gaghta Arevelyan Haystan." A report prepared for Harold Buxton's commission of inquiry into famine conditions listed 300,000 refugees (HAA f. 114, d. 2, op. 89, 2 December 1921).
1925, 13,539 refugees had resettled in Armenia from Turkey, Mesopotamia, Persia, and Greece. 46 By 1936, 42,200 "repatriates" had resettled in Armenia. 47 Gathering Armenians within the borders of the Soviet Armenian Republic in this way followed the logic of the territorialized vision of nationality that underpinned the Soviet Union. The consolidation of national groups within clearly defined territories through agricultural resettlement was, as Terry Martin has demonstrated, underway in other regions. 48 Resettlement of Armenians from abroad went hand in hand with other elements of early Soviet nationalities policy, the development of local elites, the promotion of local languages, and the development of national cultural institutions. 49 Ronald Suny suggests that the coming together of these immigrants with local Armenians to form the first Soviet Armenian generation represented "the renationalization of Armenia." 51 These efforts were a variation on the "piedmont principle" described by Martin, the process by which the Soviet Union tried to "exploit cross-border ethnic ties in order to project political influence. diaspora were cultivated not only for purposes of influence. Razmik Panossian suggests that the HOK had "the explicit purpose of generating material support for Soviet Armenia from diaspora communities." 53 This ranged from large-scale projects undertaken by the liberal diaspora organization, the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU), to the support of new settlements by compatriotic unions (groups of diaspora Armenians originating from particular towns or regions in the former Ottoman Empire).
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In the mid-1920s, the threads of refugee resettlement and diaspora connections were drawn together with broader Soviet strategies of resettlement for agricultural development.
55 By 1924, the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees, the Armenian National Delegation, and the AGBU were cooperating with the Soviet Union on a new scheme for the agricultural resettlement of 50,000 refugees. 56 Although this scheme failed, diaspora-sponsored repatriation on a smaller scale continued into the early 1930s, and the AGBU continued to fund infrastructure projects such as the building of the village of Nubarashen. 57 These developments shaped Soviet perceptions of the diaspora as a resource for social and economic development. They also embedded diaspora perceptions of the material and economic Delegation had functioned as a kind of government in exile for the diaspora during the war and had sent a joint delegation to the peace conferences with the Armenian Republic. 57 The Nubarashen project did not live up to expectations. Ter Minassian suggests that the purpose of the whole scheme was to channel diaspora money into the Soviet Union (Erevan, 97-102).
development of a Soviet republic as part of the postgenocide reconstruction of the Armenian nation. By the 1930s, these relationships had soured and both repatriation and the provision of material aid were interrupted.
The return to repatriation in 1945 was made possible by the broader realignments in the politics of national belonging in the postwar Soviet Union, which accelerated after the death of Stalin.
58 These realignments were context-specific, but in the Armenian case Maike Lehmann's work has clearly demonstrated how leaders were able to reinterpret and rearticulate central nationalities policy according to their own agendas in a process of "bargaining." 59 The repatriation scheme was a product of these processes, reflecting the ways in which, in the eyes of the leaders of Soviet Armenia, the national and the Soviet had come to coexist. 60 Reconstructing the Soviet Union and building a national homeland could be, for them, one and the same project, a reflection of the "hybridization" of Soviet and Armenian identities described by Lehmann. 61 If the launch of the repatriation campaign depended on transformations within the Soviet Union, its success depended on convincing members of the diaspora that they belonged in the Soviet Union. Liberal diaspora circles soon returned to their former positions of support, raising funds for the passages of poor repatriates and financing the building of houses, schools, and infrastructure. 62 Even the Dashnaksutyun (Armenian Revolutionary Federation, ARF), traditionally hostile to Soviet rule in Armenia, was initially prepared to support the campaign. While some left-leaning "progressive" diaspora organizations supported repatriation on ideological grounds, for the majority of the diaspora the framing of Armenia as a national homeland was most important, and repatriation propaganda reflected this. 63 The possibility of viewing a Soviet state as a national home was also aided by the prestige accorded to the Soviet Union for its role in defeating Nazi Germany; Soviet wartime concessions to the Armenian Church, including the election of a new catholicos in 1945; and Soviet claims to the Turkish provinces of Kars and Ardahan, regions that many Armenians saw as integral to the Armenian homeland. Although these claims did not come to fruition and were in reality driven by the dynamics of early Cold War geopolitics, they helped sell repatriation to the diaspora, some of whom regarded them as evidence of Soviet commitment to the reconstruction of Armenia.
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Arrivals and Losses
A decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union announced the launch of the Armenian repatriation campaign in the Soviet press on 2 December 1945. Recruitment began in earnest in diaspora communities early in 1946. The principal work of recruitment and logistics devolved to local committees in diaspora communities drawn from "progressive" diaspora organizations such as the Front national arménien (FNA) in France. 65 The response was enthusiastic. In Lebanon by the end of February 1946, 12,600 potential repatriates were reported to have signed up, with 800 more arriving every day.
66
Between registering and embarking on their voyages to the homeland, most repatriates had time to plan. A process of sorting, packing, and disposing of unwanted items thus began. 67 It was made clear that potential repatriates were not expected to leave behind their belongings and start afresh in the Soviet Union, and regardless of their material circumstances repatriates had to make decisions about the fate of their belongings. Wealthier repatriates who owned homes, machinery, and vehicles faced particular dilemmas. Taxi drivers, for example, expressed their concern that if they were not allowed to 63 Laycock, "Homelands and Homecomings," 110. bring their vehicles, they would have no means of survival. 68 For others, the sale of possessions to raise funds for repatriation was a bigger problem. The negotiation of what it was permissible to bring and the logistics of transport tested the patience as well as the organizational abilities of local repatriation committees, Soviet Armenian authorities, and repatriates in equal measure.
Although Armenian repatriates did not pass through the filtration points that screened repatriates from the DP camps of Europe, their arrival was not without anxieties. 69 Most arrived in Batumi on ships from Mediterranean ports, including Marseille and Salonica. The atmosphere in the port itself was described in one memoir as "oppressive": "Portraits of Stalin were everywhere. Loudspeakers distributed propaganda." 70 Passengers did not always arrive with their possessions intact. When the Chukotka arrived from Salonica in August 1947, numerous passengers reported losses of possessions due to damaged suitcases, accidents unloading, and what were termed "unexplained losses." 71 In repatriates' memoirs the loss of possessions en route are remembered as some of the first sources of disappointment and anxiety regarding the "homeland." The indifferent responses of officials to these losses bluntly revealed to new arrivals their lack of knowledge of the Soviet system. In Jeff et Rebecca, the French repatriate Rebecca Batrikian explains how her family discovered that one of its cases-filled with shoes, cloth for dressmaking and upholstery, and new clothes-was empty. The local chief of police simply declared that it was not his, or anybody else's, responsibility, "what is lost is lost." 72 Inventories and inquiries regarding lost possessions suggest that the Batrikians' experience was by no means unusual. The archival records demonstrate that little was done to resolve repatriate losses beyond their documentation. This was not a matter of callousness toward repatriates. Rather, the inability to address loss reflected the wider inadequacies in planning for repatriate arrivals, whatever the authorities' intentions.
According to Orvar Lofgren, "In narrating life histories people often use the acquisition of certain consumer goods or memories of cherished possessions to organize their trajectory through time." 73 In the case of the Armenian repatriations, I suggest, loss was a more important reference point and structuring principle. The heightened significance of loss in these narratives may be related to the previous experiences of repatriate families during the Armenian genocide. Narratives of the genocide frequently feature images of Armenian refugees struggling to gather personal treasures or hiding money in an attempt to survive deportation marches. 74 The loss of possessions plays a prominent role in these narratives, and even mundane domestic items that survived the genocide still play an important role in mediating personal and family memories in many diaspora communities. 75 Local inhabitants of Soviet Armenia who had lived with shortage and hardship for many years were understandably somewhat indifferent to the losses of repatriates who seemed to arrive laden with goods. 76 However, the impression of wealth created by the luggage of repatriates was often misleading. 77 Many had invested their savings or sold their homes to build new lives in Soviet Armenia. For them, the loss of belongings had serious consequences. No compensation was provided, and there was often no way to replace imported items in a society where shortages of consumer goods were endemic. Loss of a single case could jeopardize carefully laid plans for employment, the support of families, and maintaining or improving standards of living. Thus one repatriate who lost his shoemaking blocks not only lost the tools of his trade but also a link with his past work and life and his means of creating a new one in the Soviet Union. . 76 Matossian, visiting Armenia in 1957 stated that the repatriates also worsened housing conditions for the "indigenous" population causing more crowding. Some of the locals muttered, "we didn't ask you to come here" (Impact of Soviet Policies, 175). 77 The Batumi reception point stated that 10 percent of the luggage arriving on the trips made by the Chukotka was in poor condition (HAA f. 362, op. 2, d. 34, l. 7, 16 August 1947) . 78 Ibid., l. 21, report on luggage damaged during unloading, 26 August 1947.
The anxieties generated among repatriates by discoveries of loss on arrival were augmented by their first encounters with Soviet scrutiny of personal possessions. Despite Soviet encouragement to bring "as much as they could manage," their possessions would no longer be strictly private. Searches of luggage occurred at the Batumi reception center. Imported books stand out as a particular concern: in Search for a Homeland, Hagop Touryantz, a repatriate from Lebanon, describes the confiscation of his reading material. Through such scrutiny of belongings that were once thought ordinary, some repatriates came to comprehend the extent to which they might lose taken-for-granted privacies. 79 At the same time, some began to discover "survival strategies," from bribery to concealment. In Armenia as elsewhere, "a clean, warm and comfortable domicile was practically synonymous with the desire to start afresh and to put the war in the past once and for all." 82 In July 1946, Houcharar, an AGBU publication, noted: "In Erevan and its environs alone, some 500 houses are being built for the repatriates," while plans were being made for "suburban settlements." 83 The Soviet authorities had promised to construct individual homes for repatriates and offered state credit for those who wished to build their own.
84
Many diaspora Armenians, especially in the Middle East and Greece, had been without a proper home since World War I, residing in makeshift camps or barracks that had been assigned as temporary shelters during the 1920s. Regardless of whether they accepted Soviet Armenia as a national home, for many repatriates this resolved the more practical and immediate problem of permanent shelter.
The importance of domesticity is particularly evident in correspondence between the Armenian-American Repatriation Committee and the Erevan 79 Besides luggage checks, repatriates were subject to health checks and inspections of documents. 80 committee. The American committee made a number of inquiries relating to domestic life in Soviet Armenia: How were houses heated? What electrical voltages were required to run appliances? They were informed that it would be possible to bring fridges, ovens, irons, and other domestic appliances to "maintain an American standard of living." 85 These concerns regarding Soviet Armenian domestic conditions intersected with the emergence of the Cold War and tempered dreams of life in the homeland.
Ultimately, only around 311 individuals from the United States repatriated in two convoys in 1947 and in 1949. For those American-Armenians who made the journey, dreams of domestic comfort and convenience rarely came to fruition. Although inventories demonstrate that domestic appliances and cars were among the items imported by American-Armenians, their efforts were thwarted by the lack of infrastructure.
86 Tom Mooradian, a repatriate from Detroit, explained in his memoir: "Most families in the caravan had brought electrical appliances, including refrigerators and stoves, but unfortunately there was no gas or electricity to operate them."
87
Repatriates' narratives, most of which were written by those who had enjoyed relatively secure lives prior to repatriation, convey the strong sense of shock at housing conditions felt by repatriates who had been seduced by repatriation propaganda. Batrikian reported that her family had been accommodated in "two rooms and a corridor"; there was no bathroom and water had to be fetched from 100 meters away. 88 Although for repatriates from France these living conditions appeared exceptionally poor, they were probably not out of line with union-wide standards. On Victory Day, for example, two million people were still said to be living in "dug-outs." 89 The records of the Erevan committee do not suggest that the Soviet Armenian authorities deliberately targeted the repatriates. 90 had in fact been made for the provision of housing, but they either did not come to fruition or were severely delayed. In Kirovakan in 1947, 50 out of 66 apartments for repatriates had no window glass or even frames. 91 Repatriates who planned to build their own homes found it slow and difficult; state loans proved inadequate, and families often had to make do with living in unfinished homes.
92 Again, the difficult material circumstances in which the repatriates found themselves were not unique to the Armenian case but a common feature of Soviet mass resettlements. According to Lewis Siegelbaum and Leslie Moch, demobilized soldiers and farmers resettled in the Kuban in the winter of 1933-34 had also found themselves in homes without window glass.
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Housing conditions became the subject of multiple complaints, petitions, and investigations as the repatriates discovered ways to seek redress from the authorities. They suggest that concern for poor housing was not only the province of repatriates who had arrived from relatively more comfortable conditions in France. In March 1948, a report on the case of a repatriate from Palestine who was living in a "shed" concluded that the regional soviet must allocate him a private room and find him work as soon as possible. 94 Plans developed for 1948 suggest that the Erevan committee was well aware of the problems that had been encountered by the 1946-47 "caravans" but, perhaps unsurprisingly, lacked the resources to resolve them.
Materializing Difference
Repatriation propaganda had been premised on the idea of a shared Armenian identity and a shared Armenian homeland. The reality of return fractured this image of unity in multiple ways. Lehmann has explored some of the demarcation lines between locals and repatriates, from differences of language (many repatriates spoke Western Armenian as opposed to the Eastern Armenian and Russian spoken in Soviet Armenia) and cultural tradition to differing notions and expectations of civility and education. Material culture was also important in drawing these lines. These "foreign" belongings not only acted as visible identifiers of repatriates, they were also both sought after by and a source of resentment for local Armenians. Repatriates' personal possessions both helped construct demarcation lines between them and the "local" population and proved to be a source of anxiety for the Soviet authorities. This was made clear to some repatriates during the deportations of 1949. In stark contrast to the careful preparation for repatriation, deportees were abruptly taken from their homes at dawn and afforded no opportunity to gather their belongings for the journey to special settlements in Central Asia. 96 As news of the deportations spread and fears grew, some repatriates vetted their own possessions. Hagop Touryantz and his family, for example, destroyed all the books that they feared might have provoked suspicion.
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Suspect books did not simply mean texts expressing anti-Soviet political or national opinions. It seems that some were simply part of a wider group of "Western" belongings of repatriates that did not conform to Soviet living standards and perhaps had the potential to corrupt "native" Soviet Armenians. According to Touryantz, "particularly mind disturbing were, according to their pathological reasoning, the fashion journals which were meant to distract the tastes and wearing habits of the Soviet female population with bourgeois, decadent and immoral styles." Even the seemingly innocuous magazine American Home Journal was burned.
98 Soviet anxieties about these objects were perhaps heightened because the repatriates were seen as failing to conform to Soviet values in other ways. Reports from the regions expressed concerns about the repatriates' knowledge of and commitment to the Soviet system. In Artashat it was reported that the repatriates did not know the constitution or the law, while in Dilijan and Ghapan there were concerns that no propaganda work was carried out among the repatriates. 99 Clothing, as Lehmann has demonstrated, sometimes functioned as a clear and visible dividing line between the "native" and repatriate population.
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Yet the division was not always so straightforward. Not all repatriates were weathly. Soviet reports testify to a great deal of material deprivation among repatriates, especially in the regions. In one episode in 1948, the repatriation committee reported that 50 men's coats, 358 women's coats, 165 children's coats, 2,000 pairs of men's trousers, 97 pairs of children's trousers, 496 96 Andonian briefly describes the overnight disappearances of two families in his village (À chacun son destin, 63). The experience of Armenian deportees in the special settlements is beyond the scope of this article but deserving of further investigation. On special settlements, see Viktor N. Zemskov, Spetsposelentsy v SSSR 1930 -1960 (Moscow: Nauka, 2003 women's skirts, and 120 children's skirts had been distributed as aid to needy repatriates. 101 In 1948, The Armenian Review, a journal published in the diaspora under the auspices of a Dashnak Party by now firmly opposed to repatriation, turned to the fate of repatriate belongings to illustrate the shortcomings of the repatriation scheme and of the Soviet Union more generally. One of a series of highly critical articles homed in on the problem of repatriate possessions, suggesting that the Soviet authorities made a deliberate attempt to erase material distinctions between the repatriates and the native Armenians: "There is an organized effort to reduce all new-comers who are well clad and well-heeled to the status of the poverty stricken natives in order to remove the shocking contrast between them and the natives." 102 Neither archives nor repatriates' memoirs (which hardly shy away from criticism of the Soviet system) testify to such a systematic campaign to equalize repatriate and native by divesting repatriates of their belongings. Nonetheless, the focus on the material world in this article is not perhaps surprising, given the role that the material came to play in representing the difference between the Soviet and Western worlds. As Krisztina Fehevary has observed: "waning faith in the state's ability to materialize an alternative modernity was intensified by increased exposure to images and material evidence of the consumer transformations occurring in the postwar West. In this context, the opposition between state-socialist and democratic market systems became embodied in their respective products." 103 Thus belongings, and their loss, came to be imbued with an ideological significance that the repatriates never anticipated.
But differences between the material worlds of repatriates and locals did not simply reflect the binary between East and West anticipated by the diaspora critics described above. For example, differences of dress among the repatriates themselves exposed the ways in which Armenian experiences had diverged in diaspora communities. Many repatriates from France were shocked by the appearance of repatriates from the Armenian communities of the Middle East. Lazare Indjeyan described "men, the majority with beards, dressed in baggy pants and women wearing the veil and long black dresses which reached to the floor." 104 Similarly, Batrikian remarked that while Armenians from Syria and Beirut were "very elegant, in French fashions," Armenians from Jordan were dressed as "Touaregs, as if they had come from the desert!" 105 These materializations of difference further disrupted the assumptions of Armenian national unity that had underpinned repatriation propaganda, prompting many to question whether or not they really belonged in the "homeland."
Surviving the Soviet World
The repatriates had moved into a world with different approaches to production and ownership, norms and patterns of consumption, and standards of living. Hopes of continuity in domestic, social, and working lives evoked in repatriation propaganda were dispelled as the repatriates encountered the economic and social realities of postwar Armenia. Under these circumstances, the belongings that the repatriates had brought with them came to play unforeseen roles, and ordinary possessions were imbued with new significance and worth in the survival strategies of these new arrivals in the Soviet Union.
Many repatriates had taken the tools of their trade with them to Armenia. In July 1946, the FNA reported that it had overseen the formation of potential repatriates into artels of shoemakers, dressmakers, construction workers, and transport workers in preparation for their new lives in Armenia. 106 The combination of importing materials to set up in various trades and industries and the promise of plentiful work meant that some repatriates anticipated earning their living much as they had in the host countries. Others, arriving from difficult conditions in Greece and the Middle East, had the promise of education, employment, and a brighter future.
Reports produced by the Erevan Repatriation Committee suggested that these hopes indeed became a reality. A summary of the progress of the 1947 repatriates claimed that all repatriates capable of working were able to find jobs in the first few days in industries, artels, producers' cooperatives, agriculture, and the cultural and educational arenas. 107 These reports contrast with the more negative image presented in repatriates' memoirs and with the high levels of poverty evident in the investigations and reports of the Repatriation Committee. The French repatriate Albert Andonian explained the difficulties of economic survival in the early years of repatriation: "None of the repatriates worked, or nearly none"; instead, "everybody sold their belongings." His claim that a couple from Lyon lived for ten years that way is presumably exaggerated but is indicative of the importance attached to the fate of repatriate possessions in diasporic social memory.
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The problems faced by repatriates in coming to terms with a new economic system were heightened by the context of postwar shortage. This became apparent to the repatriates soon after they began their voyage. Batrikian's account describes Georgians collecting the stale bread they threw from the ship at Batumi: "Don't do that! Bread is rare here. We are hungry! Expect the worst!" 109 Although the food situation gradually improved, as Donald Filtzer explains, "even by the end of the Stalin period, production and consumption of underwear, hosiery, shoes and cloth was extremely limited, and while the availability of food now surpassed that of the war years and the 1947 famine, the diet was still poor in quality, this was not a society even remotely approaching a comfortable standard of living." 110 Thus the Armenian repatriates faced years of hardship. 111 Regardless of their financial situation, repatriates found that the economy of the Soviet Union simply made no sense to them. Mooradian observed that "the law of supply and demand was meaningless in a planned society that did not provide enough food for its population," while Sona Meghreblian's family were astounded by the cost of living: "It was too early yet for us to comprehend the reality of Soviet life: that the cost of essentials-food, clothing-was outrageously high. … How people managed to exist with their low salaries was a mystery which would slowly be revealed to us by our daily experiences." 112 Repatriates had to learn the rules of the Soviet material world and the norms of consumption and provisioning. To purchase from the shops it was necessary to be "in the know," to have contacts to alert one to the timing of deliveries and other essential information. 113 Such personal networks were central to the functioning of the USSR's informal economy or blat (papakh in Armenian). As Alena Ledeneva has explained, "Blat exchange was often mediated and covered by the rhetoric of friendship or acquaintance: 'sharing,' 'helping out,' 'friendly support,' 'mutual care,' etc. Intertwined with personal networks, blat provides access to public resources through personal channels." 114 Most repatriates, in the early days, lacked these contacts and networks, but many were, over subsequent years, able to develop them.
Taking part in the Soviet consumer system involved recognition of the new values attached to the everyday belongings that they had brought with them. As Igor Kopytoff observes, "in any society the individual is often caught between the cultural structure of commoditization and his own personal attempts to bring a value order to the universe of things." 115 In the case of the repatriates, this meant a realization that ordinary belongings-clothes, shoes, appliances, or tools-had become special due to their rarity or the prestige associated with their Western origins. In memoirs repatriates seem to have been caught between the new values attached to their possessions in the Soviet Union and their attachment to them as reminders of their lives before repatriation. Batrikian was forced to sell her bicycle to help her family survive. The bicycle had been given to her as a gift upon leaving school in France and meant much more than a means of transport. Its sale was symbolic of the break with her life in France and educational achievements that seemed meaningless in Soviet Armenian society. 116 The sale of belongings sometimes had happier endings, however, or could help to integrate repatriates into local social networks. Lucie Der Sarkissian had little option but to sell the sewing machine she had brought from France. Sewing machines, she explains, were rare in Soviet Armenia at the time and could be sold for the equivalent of one and half month's salary, allowing the whole family to survive for a little longer. This sale had unexpected consequences, providing her with a way in to Soviet Armenian society. The wife of the person who bought her sewing machine took an interest in her and helped her prepare for the exam for the teaching college. This allowed her to start a new career and build a more secure future in Armenia.
117 Despite these steps, a sense of belonging in Soviet Armenia still evaded Lucie and her husband, Jean, who left Armenia and returned to a diasporan existence in France.
Conclusion
While the voluntary nature of the Armenian repatriations was at odds with Cold War narratives emphasizing flight from the USSR, they were far from unique, part of a postwar global landscape of displacements and resettlements. These movements of population were connected, in various ways, to the definition and reconstruction of states and to postwar reconstruction. The claim that diaspora Armenians belonged in the Soviet republic made perfect sense in the contexts of these global processes but also according to the particularities of Soviet nationalities policy and in the context of longer-term Soviet projects and techniques to transform society. They were a product of the emergence of the kind of state in which redefining who belonged and viewing populations as movable and malleable had become normalized.
The launch of the repatriation campaign was driven by the economic and political imperatives of the postwar moment. However, that the Soviet Union was able to convince Armenians who had never before set foot in Soviet Armenia that they belonged within its borders was a result of the legacies of the Armenian genocide and of connections between resettlement and development forged during the interwar period. Precedents of diaspora aid were essential in shaping perceptions in the Armenian Republic and in Moscow of diaspora Armenians as a resource.
The success of the repatriation scheme relied on the kind of hybridization of national and Soviet identities described by Lehmann. 118 Although Lehmann focuses on the postwar era, that the idea of a Soviet Armenian homeland already had such a powerful appeal in 1945 indicates a need to examine more closely the roots of this hybridization in the period before World War II. Repatriation should not then be understood as either a Soviet economic project or an Armenian national project. Rather, in 1945, for both the diaspora and the republic, these two elements were understood as closely entwined. The Armenian population (and its belongings) were thus claimed by the Soviet Union not only as a convenient economic remedy but also as part of the broader project of making a utopian vision of both Soviet society and the Armenian nation a reality. The reality of repatriation, however, caused both sides to change their minds.
While the repatriation schemes are indicative of the nature and ambition of postwar Soviet population politics, they are also a reminder that such grand schemes frequently had unintended consequences. Considering repatriates' belongings reveals the reality of the hardships that repatriates endured, exposing the inadequacies of Soviet planning and helping to explain why so many chose to leave the Soviet Union. It also reveals a rather different side of the repatriation story, demonstrating how, in the face of hardship, repatriates proved to be resourceful. They used their belongings in creative ways to survive and sometimes to thrive in Soviet Armenia, to forge new relationships and identifications. Material possessions mediated repatriate relationships with the Soviet authorities and "locals," accentuating or bridging difference according to particular contexts. They provided means of connecting with, subverting, and in some cases escaping the Soviet system.
Loss of belongings and endurance of material hardships acted as one of many indicators to repatriates that the Soviet Union represented an inauthentic national home. In a Cold War context, domestic material culture and consumer goods had a particular resonance, powerfully articulating the difference between old lives in the West and new lives behind the Iron Curtain. Stories of material hardship or the loss of personal belongings continue to play an important role in expressing this sense of disappointment or resentment with the Soviet system. Although the Armenian experience of repatriation was relatively unusual, the turn to material goods to express these feelings was not. Fehevary argues that across the socialist world "emblematic goods of state-socialist production as well as their settings came to be seen as evidence of the failure of a state-socialist-generated modernity, but importantly, of the regime's negligent and even 'inhumane' treatment of its subjects." 119 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the independent Republic of Armenia and the diaspora has been in a process of flux. The question of whether independent Armenia can represent an authentic homeland for all Armenians remains a contested issue, but the Armenian government has nonetheless encouraged diasporan investment 119 Fehevary, "Goods and States," 429. and resettlement, and some sectors of the diaspora have promoted the notion of diasporan responsibility for improving the social, political, and economic state of the homeland. More recently, the arrival in the republic of Armenians fleeing conflict in Syria has prompted arguments that these new arrivals should be welcomed both as a matter of responsibility toward fellow Armenians and because their perceived skills in business and commerce, if not their material possessions, could be a valuable asset to the republic. Thus even in this radically different social and political landscape, the discourses of homeland as a sanctuary for the diaspora and the diaspora as a resource for the homeland have remained entwined, holding a powerful, if contested, appeal for homeland and diaspora alike. 
